Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Read




Choices Under Fire by Michael Bess

A serious subject discussed with surprisingly light, 21st century language, possibly in the hope to make the content more accessible to the general reader. Stylistic reservations aside, the book fails to fully flesh out with the level of detail, both historical/ contextual and philosophical the subjects seems to demand. Some chapters seem more like outlines, waiting to be filled in. Discussing racial and religious bigotry world-wide, not just by the nazis seems an important facet to discuss. There is, however, surprising little discussion of the Holocaust throughout the book. It could be argued with hindsight, that racism in the allied countries contributed to tepid efforts to aid Jewish refugees in the period prior to the war. (This is not necessarily an argument this book makes, but worthy of investigating.) There is also the question of how much of the Nazi horrors against the Jews and others were well-known in the west, and may have contributed to attitudes of conduct of the war, such as bombing civilian populations, or weather the extent of those horrors were only discovered after the fall of Germany, and provided retrospective justification for some of our own actions during the war. Possibly this aspect of the war has been discussed exhaustively by others and it was not going over again, but there remains in discussions of moral choices basic questions taken from other moments in history: “What did (they) know and when did (they) know it?” The period cries out for more detail in the historical account than is rendered here.

The chapter on the battle for Midway, while a well-told, thrilling narrative, does not strike me as any different than any other conventional story of battle: risky decisions in the moment that may or may not have turned out in the advantage for one side or another.

The heart of the book, as it should be, is centered around the bombing of civilian populations, culminating in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ample time is spent on Hiroshima, though the chapter on previous civilian bombing again cries for more thorough examination. The discussion of Hiroshima, while convincing on its face, narrows the argument between invasion and use of the atomic bomb, pursuing unconditional surrender. From a moral/ ethical viewpoint, were these really the only choices? Were there really no other choices besides possibly killing millions--many of them noncombatants--and killing hundreds of thousands of noncombatants? It is entirely possible that even posing that question is to apply post-WWII standards onto an inappropriate time: that it was because of the very severity of the conduct of WWII that contributed to the post-war conventions trying to regulate the conduct of war. It would have been impossible to apply those standards in 1945, it could be argued; or would it? Even with the mind-set that WWII represented a conflict of total war against all aspects of the opposing society, not just the political and military elite, is there not a recognizable line for noncombatant casualties beyond which is accessible even in the most dire circumstances? Or is (was) the pursuit of defeat of an evil enemy justification for use of any means, no matter how horrific? Could these line not been seen in real time, as events unfolded, not just retrospectively? By many accounts, this one included, little thought was given at the time to moral implication of either the fire-bombing or the atomic bombing of Japan. Little is demonstrated here.

Still, the most problematic areas of the book for me was the discussion of the legacy of WWII. The book paints a far rosier picture of decades after the war than seems justified. While there is economic and social integration within Europe, there remain tensions between world-views of left and right economic policy. Even with Europe united in many ways, countries remain entrenched in their national (political) and social traditions. The questions are asked toward the end of the book: Who won the war? What is the legacy of the war? Has “Hitlerism”--or the ideas that led to his rise to power--been defeated?

Who won the war?
What is the legacy of the war?
Has “Hitlerism been defeated?

There is a strong argument to make, and the book approached it but does not
say so explicitly, that the Soviet Union won the war in Europe, with assistance by Britain
and the United States. Britain succeeded in defeating German partly by not falling. If
Britain had fallen, German dominance of Europe would have been complete, though
their ability to hold British territory for any length of time would have been unlikely.
Assuming a British resistance campaign, similar to the one waged in France and other
countries, there is little reason to doubt that German reprisals would have been intense
and bloody. But the British did hold out, with American support, and despite the late US
entry of ground troops into the war, the combined US and British offensive was decisive,
certainly. But as impressive as that was, it was no match to both the Soviet resistance
and offensive.
The book clearly documents the immense sacrifice of the Soviet
resistance, with enormous human cost, and the material cost that wrecked on the German war capacity. Like others before him, Hitler’s fatal strategic mistake was to not only think he could conquer Russia, but to do so as a second front, while still pursuing the fall of Britain in the west and the complete subjugation of France. Certainly, Britain’s resistance undermined German military ambitions generally, but the forces both material and human that the Soviets were able to deploy in defense of their frontier were truly remarkable. Once the Soviets moved beyond the defensive position and moved to an offensive attack against German forces, their march toward Berlin was impressive and seemingly unstoppable. There is little doubt that they were approaching complete victory over Hitler even without the progress on the western front, though there is no question that US and British effort hastened the Axis defeat. A soviet victory alone would have likely prolonged the war into Italy, North Africa and elsewhere in an extended agonizing campaign.
There is also ample evidence, as the book demonstrates, that the Soviet entry into the Pacific war against Japan was also decisive. Here the roles were reversed: the US had been the primary resistance to Japan, while the Soviet entry into engagement on the “western front” of the Pacific war was decisive in undermining Japanese capacity, already weakened by the American effort, to fight on both the Chinese mainland and the Pacific theatre simultaneously. It is entirely possible that the US would have ultimately prevailed over Japan without Soviet help, though the cost in material and human assets would have been immense, as the book persuasively demonstrated. Certainly the Soviet entry further undermined Japan at a critical moment.
Of course, the deciding factor in the Pacific was the Atomic bomb: only the US had it, and was willing to use it. The Soviets had waged an immense battle in Europe to stunning effect, but had basically used the same technology as had been available in the first world war, though with increased precision and lethality. The Atom bomb was a whole other technological achievement that unquestionably placed the US in undisputed technological vanguard. One could argue that the US had benefited from an immense, sophisticated economy—even during the great depression—and that it had not been weakened by direct attack on its cities or infrastructure during the course of the war, as had Britain and the rest of Europe. Regardless, the US had devoted the resources to develop the bomb—with its “success” being not at all certain—and the willingness to deploy it in battle. Even with Soviet near-victory in Europe, the technological leap of the Atom bomb clearly signaled the US as the “winner” by sheer might, of World War II.
Of course, the use of Atom bomb is at the heart of the question of the moral
implications of the war. It certainly informs the “legacy” of the war, through the end of the 20th and into the 21st centuries. It can be argued there are two parts of that legacy, the structural if you will, that includes the new international institutions and conventions for relations and cooperation, and the realpolitik reality of the post-war decades as an often lethal contest between the war’s victors.
The book makes much of the structural changes established after the war, starting with the Nuremberg trials, the updated Geneva conventions and the establishment of the UN. (The UN gets surprisingly little attention.) While the discussion of the Nuremberg trials is cogent, an opportunity to link some of the basic issues of war crimes and later US behavior seems missed (see below). Indeed, the chapter on post-war Europe focuses much hopeful rhetoric on the thawed relations between France and Germany. While European stability is certainly admirable, it was established under the shadow of American and Soviet dominance, a small part of the global conflict that became known as the cold war. Europe had become almost irrelevant. Relations between European states took on far less importance on the world stage then they had for centuries. European states seemed fine with letting the US assume the role of Military protector, so that they could focus on reconstruction. 
Institutionally, the various UN agencies have been quite effective in establishing
aid distribution and monitoring international crises, but as a forum for resolving or preventing conflicts, it record remains mixed. The more democratic forum of the general assembly is more often dominated by the Security Council, again a structure designed to uphold the interest of the “major” military powers, often at the expense of less powerful nations. Many critics see the UN as little more than rhetorical cover for the handful of powerful nations to exploit and dominate the less powerful; what had been outright colonization a century before has been adopted in the latter half of the 20th century into a more subtle for of colonization that benefits outsider (international corporate) interests for resource extraction and cheap labor, at the expense of the local population; these often include installations of “friendly” governments, financial and economic restrictions leading to dependence, all under the cloak of legitimacy and legality. While the UN is the more public face of post-war internationalism, other institutions, less widely known to the average American citizen, such as the World Back and the International Monetary Fund have as much of a role in shaping international policy (and furthering western development interests) as the UN general assembly. For all of the seemingly accessible and democratic nature of the UN, more and more of the real power in shaping international affairs in the decades after WWII remains hidden behind boardroom doors that the average citizen of most of the world’s countries has no access to. Additionally, many smaller countries feel the UN is so dominated by a small number of dominant players, especially through the Security Council, that there is little real forum for redress of grievances. The situation is even more tenuous for displaced or stateless peoples who have little formal recognition within the UN without a recognized state sponsor. 
While the UN is the most conspicuous of the international structures developed in
the post-war period, it highlights some of the structural deficiencies built into those systems that still affect us today. If the greatest flaw in UN structure is the Security Council dominated by a small number of military powers, the post-war military competition undermines the effectiveness of the other legal structures designed to keep peace and prosecute crimes. If the greatest powers refuse to be held accountable to the same laws and standards they apply to others, the entire system of laws is undermined. The US has withdrawn from recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over its actions. There is a long and well-documented history of the US and the Soviet Union engaging in extra-legal military actions either directly or through proxies in various countries around the globe, from Iran to Argentina, Nicaragua, the Caribbean and countless others. It is almost unthinkable that any of the American or Soviet architects of foreign policy would ever be held accountable to any international court of justice. In the rare instance when a case was made against US military action (Nicaragua vs. the US), the US simply refused to accept the ICCs jurisdiction. Such “exceptionalism” undermines the efficacy of the rule of law in international affairs. Laws are meant to apply to both the powerful as well as the weak. The current system of unequal application of international law reinforces the notion of basic inequity in world affairs.
What is the opposite of Hitler’s world? “Hitlerism” is not clearly defined in the
book, as if it is common knowledge. Certainly, elements of Hitler’s ideology are clearly defined and proclaimed: Extreme racism and anti-Semitism, fervent anti-communism (often overlooked), nationalism, militarism, conservative economic policy, unilateralism. 
Has the world moved away from these tendencies since the end of the war? In some regards, yes, though for all the international structures established to promote peace and cooperation, persistent conflict continues. The world is awash in weapons, and the US is by far the world’s leading arms merchant, as well as possessing the greatest number of both nuclear and conventional weapons. In the 45 years after the end of WWII, the justification for the arms build-up had been to counter the spread of Soviet and Chinese communism. This was more than rhetorical conflict, with “proxy wars” between the US and the Soviets—many without UN sanction or legal legitimacy—leaving millions of dead and wounded. Since the turn from communism in Russia in 1989, the shift in focus has turned to international terrorism as a justification for ever increasing military procurement. Meanwhile, there has been limited progress in the correcting poverty in some areas, though population pressures and climate stresses related to rapid industrialization in countries such as India, China and Brazil threaten to undermine what progress has been made. There remains huge disparities between the rich and the poor, both between and within countries. This has fueled a restive population and in some cases open rebellion against existing orders, often escalating into violence. Internationally, it seems more difficult to come to consensus agreements on common problems, such as climate change for example, while the rich countries work to maintain their advantaged positions, and developing countries struggle to “modernize” at any cost. Meanwhile, international businesses exploit inconsistencies in regulations within and between countries to maximize profits, often at the expense of social good, both locally and internationally. 
Was the allied victory in WWII not as much a moral victory as a military one; Those with the most devastating weapons won; the insistence on total surrender and the willingness to continue to perpetuate violence until that total surrender was complete suggest that military might was the moral foundation of the war. In the decision to use the atomic bombs against a weakened enemy for whom victory was impossible implies a moral aesthetic that insists on absolute power. Sadly, this is not too distant from Hitler’s own glorification of notions of racial and military supremacy as a unifying national goal. There was little of the rhetoric of the previous European war that the conflict to defeat Hitler was a “war to end all wars.” (That slogan may have been recognized as fatuous even in 1914.) But the one abiding legacy of WWII is that the world is increasingly awash in weapons and on a permanent war footing, with few countries resistant to the effects of militarism. While countries are more inter-connected internationally than ever before, and new forums exist for conflict resolution not available to previous generations, violent conflict both within and between countries persists. 
Is there a way out of this cycle of militarism and violence? The hope must
lie in the structures created after the war, the UN, the world court and the international criminal court. These are the best mechanisms yet created for promoting international peace and justice. Their effectiveness necessitates radical reform and elimination of any exceptionalist treatment, with international law applying equally to all nations, large and small. This needs to be combined with a concerted effort for international disarmament for both large and small weapons.
Again my main concern is that the book paints too optimistic a portrait of the post-war world. Like many books on the war, the battles of WWII are isolated from their lingering longer-term effects. We are left with general impression that horrific nature of the Axis regimes justified extreme measures to defeat them. Such an attitude persisted into the cold (and hot) wars that followed. Of course, nations did not fundamentally re-define themselves during the course of WWII; the ideologies that shaped the cold war conflict existed in Soviet Communism and American Capitalism prior to the struggle to defeat Hitler. But again, the defeat of Hitler and his allies was primarily a military one, built on utter destruction of the enemy’s resources and society. The post-war accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons was built upon that same premise: the presumption of the possibility of utter destruction of a given opponent. Ever-expanding militarism since WWII is its most tragic legacy.